ANOTHER LEGAL INJUSTICE SIMILAR TO DAWN'S

Bashed by the cops and out of pocket by $150,000

Gary Tippet

September 24, 2006

Corinna Horvath's jaw and nose were broken so badly she spent five days in hospital.

When the police crashed through her door one night in 1996, they left Corinna Horvath senseless and with a horribly shattered nose. In a lasting piece of collateral damage, the lawyer who took on — and won — her case was left with a bill of nearly $500,000, a contempt of court charge and a possible jail sentence.

In what may have been a rush of blood during a successful 38-day trial, solicitor Mark Morgan agreed to underwrite Ms Horvath's case in which she was awarded $150,000 damages for assault. But more than a decade after she was bashed, Ms Horvath is yet to receive a cent of that money. Mr Morgan is to front another court after failing to pay $436,877 in legal costs.

More...

COURT DOCUMENTS SEPT-OCT 2007

Dawn has asked that these Court documents be made available to interested friends. Watch this space: I'll post some time a short introduction explaining each of them:

IN THE FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA
REGISTRY: ADELAIDE ADG 95 of 2007
IN THE MATTER OF: DAWN MARGARET ROWAN
THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA
APPLICANT
DAWN MARGARET ROWAN RESPONDENT
ORDER
REGISTRAR: P CHRISTIE
DATE OF ORDER: 28 SEPTEMBER 2007
WHERE MADE: ADELAIDE
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1. A sequestration order be made against the estate of Dawn Margaret Rowan.
2. The applicant creditor's costs, including any reserved costs, be taxed pursuant to the Federal Court Rules and paid from the estate of the respondent in accordance with the Bankruptcy Act 1966.
The Court notes that the date of the act of bankruptcy is 18 October 2006.
Date entry stamped: 28 SEPTEMBER 2007

Note:
Subsection 104 (2) of the Federal Magistrates Court Act 1999 provides that a party to proceedings in which a Registrar has exercised any of the powers of the Court under subsection 102 (2), or under a delegation under subsection 103 (1), of the Act may, within the time prescribed by the Rules of Court, or within any further time allowed in accordance with the Rules of Court, apply to the Court to review that exercise of power.
Rule 2.03 provides that, subject to any direction by the Court or a Federal Magistrate to the contrary, an application under subsection 104 (2) of the Act for review of the exercise of a power of the Court by a Registrar under subsection 102 (2), or under a delegation under subsection 103 (1), of the Act must be made by application for review within 21 days after the day on which the power was exercised. An applicant seeking a review can apply to a Federal Magistrate to waive the requirement that the application for review under subsection 104 (2) of the Act be made by application for review (see subrule 1.06 (1) of the Federal Magistrates Court Rules 2001).
Prepared in the Adelaide District Registry, Federal Magistrates Court of Australia, Level 5, Commonwealth Law Courts, 3 Angas Street, ADELAIDE SA 5000, Telephone (08) 8219 1000

*****

FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA
AT ADELAIDE ADG 95 OF 2007
IN THE MATTER OF: DAWN MARGARET ROWAN
BETWEEN: COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA
APPLICANT
AND: DAWN MARGARET ROWAN
RESPONDENT
REGISTRAR: P CHRISTIE
DATE: 28 SEPTEMBER 2007
PLACE: ADELAIDE
REASONS FOR DECISION
1 A creditor's petition was filed in this matter on 18 April 2007. The creditor's petition
is stated to be founded upon an act of bankruptcy committed by failure to comply with a
bankruptcy notice deemed to have been served on the respondent on 27 September 2006.
The bankruptcy notice claims an amount of $380,000, being costs fixed by the Full Court of
the Supreme Court of South Australia in Action No. 1481 of 1990 ('the Supreme Court
matter') on 13 April 2006. The debt is admitted by the respondent.
2 However on 22 May 2007 the respondent filed a notice setting out two grounds of
opposition to the petition. The first was that she is solvent, and has the capacity to pay the
amount claimed by the applicant. The second was that the applicant has failed to use
appropriate alternate means of recovering the alleged debt from the respondent, such as
judgment debt recovery mechanisms under State law.
3 At the first listing of the matter the respondent made an oral application for transfer of
the proceedings to the Melbourne registry as a result of what she stated to be her impecunious
circumstances and hardship in having to travel to Adelaide arising from those circumstances
and poor health. The petitioning creditor had not had notice of the application and as a result
had no instructions in relation to it. So as not to delay the hearing of the matter unduly, the

-2-
parties agreed to the making of orders for the filing of material in preparation for the hearing of the matter and in relation to the transfer, with a view to the substantive matter being heard on the next occasion, or if it could not, then the issue of transfer being re-agitated at that time. The respondent was advised that a subsequent hearing could be by way of video conference but indicated she would prefer to appear in person.
4 The transfer application was not pursued on the subsequent hearing of the matter, at which time the substantive matter was dealt with, although leave was given for the filing of written submissions by the respondent on or before 14 September 2007. No submissions were filed pursuant to that leave, although on 19 September 2007 the Court received certain documents, other copies of which appear to have been sent to various parties/people involved in the Supreme Court matter. To a large degree the documents appear to reiterate statements made by the respondent at the time of the hearing of this matter regarding her desire to have the proceedings stayed to allow her to enter into private negotiations with the petitioning creditor and other parties, with a view to making "any party who believes they have been damaged in any way whatsoever, commercially whole again and in the right way ". Those statements were taken to be a request for adjournment of the hearing and were dealt with at that time. The documents received by the Court were marked "Strictly Private and Confidential Not for Public Filing" and addressed to me as a "courtesy copy" only. These clearly were not intended to be filed as submissions and were not treated as such. I do not propose to consider them further in these reasons.
5 I turn therefore to the substantive matter, that is, whether or not a sequestration order should be made. A consideration of that issue is governed by s 52 of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 ("the Act").
RELEVANT PROVISIONS
6 Subsection 52(1) of the Act sets out the matters which must be proved before a sequestration order can be made. It provides as follows:
"(1) At the hearing of a creditor's petition, the Court shall require proof of:
(a) the matters stated in the petition (for which purpose the Court may accept the affidavit verifying the petition as sufficient);
(b) service of 'the petition; and

-3-
(c) the fact that the debt or debts on which the petitioning creditor relies is or are still owing;
and, if it is satisfied with the proof of those matters, may make a sequestration order against the estate of the debtor.
7 However, s 52(2) of the Act goes on to provide that:
"(2) If the Court is not satisfied with the proof of any of those matters, or is satisfied by the debtor:
(a) that he or she is able to pay his or her debts; or
(b) that for other sufficient cause a sequestration order ought not to be made;
it may dismiss the petition. "
8 The Court must therefore consider whether the matters requiring proof under s 52(1) have been proved and, if so, whether the respondent has satisfied the Court that she is able to pay her debts or that there is some other sufficient cause why a sequestration order ought not be made, hi addition to the matters to be proved pursuant to s 52, r 4.06 of the Federal Magistrates Court (Bankruptcy) Rules 2006 requires that certain affidavit material be filed before the hearing of the creditor's petition. That material has been filed.
9 It has not been argued that the requirements of s 52(1) have not been met and, subject to the further consideration of one issue, I am satisfied on the basis of the affidavit material filed by the petitioning creditor that they have. The issue which I am of the view requires further consideration arises from the existence of an injunction restraining the respondent from dealing with her assets. The respondent is self-represented and although she raised the issue only indirectly, without precisely articulating it as a distinct ground, I believe it should be addressed in my consideration of the application of s 52(1) and s 52(2) of the Act to the facts before me. However, given the fact that the respondent has specifically raised the issue of her ability to pay her debts as a primary ground of opposition to the petition and that a consideration of this question is also of central relevance to the issues surrounding the injunction, I will consider first the question of her solvency.

-4-
SOLVENCY
10 As noted above s 52(2)(a) provides that, where a debtor shows that she is able to pay
her debts, a court may dismiss a petition. A debtor who is in a position to pay all her debts
within a relatively short time generally ought not to be the subject of a sequestration order.
11 The classic statement of the law in this regard is that of Barwick CJ in Sandell v
Porter (1966) 115 CLR 666. His Honour referred to the inability to pay debts as they fell due
but referred not only to the use of cash resources immediately available for this purpose but
also to monies which can be procured by realization by sale, mortgage or pledge of assets
within a relatively short time. He went on to note that:
'The conclusion of insolvency ought to be clear from a consideration of the debtor's financial position in its entirety and generally speaking ought not to be drawn simply from evidence of a temporary lack of liquidity. It is the debtor's inability, utilising such resources as he has or can command through the use of his assets, to meet his debts as they fall due which indicates insolvency." (at 670)
12 However, a debtor must not only establish an ability to pay any debts that are
currently due but also those that will fall due in the reasonably immediate future pursuant to
existing obligations (Re Sanders; Knudsen & Yates trading as The Hargreaves Practice v
Sanders [2003] FCA 1079 at [27] ("Knudsen "). It is also not enough for a debtor to establish
merely that he or she has assets exceeding in value the amount of his or her liabilities. The
debtor must establish that the assets are available to be realised and capable of ready
realisation (Stankiewicz v Plata [2000] FCA 1185 at [26]-[32]; Australian & New Zealand
Banking Group v Foyster [2000] FCA 400 at [17]; Knudsen (above)).
13 In addition, a house, furniture and a motor vehicle are generally regarded as assets
necessary for a reasonably comfortable and dignified existence and as such might ordinarily
be excluded when considering the assets of a debtor which could be used to meet his or her
debts (International Alpaca Management Pty Ltd v Ensor [1999] FCA 72 per Katz J at [14]
('International Alpaca ")). Despite this, in my view, where a house has significant value it
might appropriately be taken into account in considering a debtor's ability to pay his or her
debts, at least to the extent that it could be sold and a house of lesser value acquired or to the
extent that it could be used as security for borrowing. However, where new or additional
borrowings are in question it is incumbent upon the debtor to show that he or she has the

-5-
capacity to pay for, secure or otherwise satisfy any new debt so as to establish that he or she is not merely substituting one debt for another (Re Capel; ex parte Caram Finance Australia Z^[1998]FCA372).
14 The respondent has deposed the following in relation to her assets and liabilities:
Assets Value Liability
House - St Andrews Vic 400,000 137,696.53#
Money from the sale of a property in 2005 202,561.89
held in a trust account as a result of a
Mareva injunction
Supreme Court of South Australia fund - 30,000
arising from costs order in her favour in
the original trial in that action*
Shire of Nillumbik 3,000
(rates - approximate figure)
Petitioning creditor's debt 380,000
State of South Australia - costs orders 17,000
arising from an unsuccessful interlocutory 24,000
application in the Supreme Court of South
Australia and an unsuccessful application
for special leave to appeal in the High
Court of Australia
# this is a line of credit and the limit appears to be $298,500, with an additional Visa card limit of $9,000.
* there is no other evidence before the court in relation to this amount.
15 The affidavit evidence filed by the petitioning creditor is that there is a further debt
owing to it of $2,000 arising from additional costs orders made by the Supreme Court of
South Australia at the time of the making of the injunctive orders referred to above. A further
costs order made by the High Court of Australia in favour of the petitioning creditor at the
time of the refusal of an application by the respondent for special leave to appeal from the
decision of the Full Court of the Supreme Court of South Australia has been quantified at
$13,259.97, but has not yet been taxed, and a costs order arising from the application for the

-6-
fixed costs amount founding the bankruptcy notice was also made in favour of the petitioning creditor on 13 April 2006. The latter amount does not yet appear to have been quantified.
16 It appears that the quantum of the two amounts said to be owing to the State of South
Australia is disputed by the respondent and they have not yet been subject to taxation. The
State of South Australia appeared as a supporting creditor in this matter, but did not file any
additional material.
17 Two other potential debts have also been identified by the respondent. They relate to
costs orders made in favour of two other parties in the Supreme Court matter. It appears that
to date these amounts may not have been formally quantified (although there are indications
in the material filed that they would in each case be in the hundreds of thousands of dollars).
There is no evidence that they are being actively pursued, although there is also no evidence
that they have been compromised.
18 No information has been provided by the respondent in relation to her income and
expenditure, although she has deposed that she is "only able to work a few hours each week"
and is "unable to make regular payments to ING in relation to the line of credit they have
provided" and that she is "getting further into debt with each passing week".
19 In addition, in correspondence dated 25 July 2005 between her former legal
representatives and the legal representatives of the petitioning creditor, her legal
representatives noted that the respondent "has no hope of being able to satisfy any of the
claims for costs ".
20 There is no evidence before me to suggest that the respondent could service additional
borrowings or a further draw down of her secured line of credit. In fact the evidence is that
she cannot support her liability in respect of funds already drawn down. I am therefore not
prepared to take into account the possibility of an additional draw down on that line of credit
in the absence of a subsequent forced realisation of the associated security in considering
whether she is able to pay her debts.
21 I turn therefore to consider the respondent's ability to realise assets to pay her debts.
On the evidence before me the only non-cash asset owned by the respondent is her house

-7-
property. The value ascribed by the respondent to her house is her assessment of value, based on results of other property sales in the area. There is no independent evidence of this. However, even if that valuation is accepted, it is not clear that this asset should be taken into account in considering the assets which could be realised by the respondent to pay her debts within any relatively short period of time (International Alpaca (above)). There is also no evidence that, even if the injunctive orders currently in existence were varied or discharged, the respondent has any interest in doing this. She has indicated from the Bar Table that she wishes to make parties that may have been "damaged in any manner" by her actions "commercially -whole", however there is no evidence at all that she is inclined to sell her house in order to do so. I am therefore also not willing to take this asset into account for the purpose of determining whether or not the respondent is able to pay her debts. Even if I did take the possible sale of her house property into account, however, there is no evidence of the likelihood of achieving a sale at her stated value in the reasonably immediate future or of the costs of such a sale. I do not believe that the debtor has established that it has a net readily realisable value such that, together with her cash assets, her readily realisable assets exceed her undisputed debts.
22 The respondent has therefore not satisfied me that she is able to pay her undisputed
debts either immediately or within any relatively short time. In these circumstances I do not
need to consider the extent to which the other unquantified or disputed liabilities should be
taken into account.
INJUNCTION
23 I turn therefore to the issue flagged above, namely the impact, if any, of a Mareva
injunction on my consideration of the proper application of s 52 of the Act. In my view the
impact of the injunction must be considered in two contexts, namely:
(1) whether a valid act of bankruptcy has occurred; and
(2) whether the obtaining of the injunction constitutes other sufficient cause why a sequestration order should not be made.
24 The respondent has deposed that on the application of the petitioning creditor, the
Supreme Court of South Australia granted an injunction in August 2005 restraining her from

-8-
dealing with her assets. Orders were made in October 2005 continuing the injunction, which appears to remain in force. As far as is relevant, the terms of the order made on 20 October 2005 are that:
"1. The injunction granted by the order dated 19 August 2005 and varied on 26 August 2005 whereby the plaintiff was restrained whether by herself, her employees, agents, attorneys or otherwise from:
1.1 from [sic] disposing of or encumbering in any manner whatsoever any of her assets whether such assets be within or outside South Australia; and
1.2 if any such assets be within South Australia, from removing such assets from South Australia;
provided that:
1.3 the plaintiff may use her assets for normal daily living expenses and to that end may dispose of assets not exceeding $500.00 in value per week
continue in full force and effect until further order.
2. ….
3. The parties have liberty to apply on short but reasonable notice. "
25 Section 40(l)(g) of the Act relevantly provides that a debtor commits an act of
bankruptcy where a creditor has obtained a final judgment or order the execution of which
has not been stayed, and has served a debtor with a bankruptcy notice, the requirements of
which are not complied with. If no act of bankruptcy has been committed, because execution
of the judgment relied upon had been stayed, s 52(1) is not satisfied.
26 It is, however, not necessary for there to be in place an express order staying the
execution of the judgment for the judgment to be effectively stayed for the purposes of
s 40(l)(g) of the Act (Re Richards; Ex Parte Sommers (1947) 14 ABC 112). If the creditor is
not in a position to obtain a writ of execution on the judgment, the judgment cannot be used
to found a bankruptcy notice and no act of bankruptcy will be committed as a result of failure
to comply with such a notice (Re Pannowitz; Ex Parte Wilson (1975) 38 FLR 184; Penning v
Steel Tube Supplies Pty Ltd (1988) 18 FCR 568).

-9-
27 There is a large body of authority dealing with what constitutes an effective stay of a
judgment in the context of the existence of an order restraining a debtor from dealing with his
or her assets. Much of it is summarised conveniently by Madgwick J in National Australia
Bank Limited v Pollak [2001] FCA 1408 ("Pollak"). On my understanding the law as it
currently stands can be summarised as follows:
• A Mareva injunction, one of the functions of which is to aid execution, does not impose the same restrictions on execution that the appointment of a receiver or trustee to control the property of a debtor does (Re Ousley; Ex parte Commissioner of Taxation (1994) 48 FCR131 ("Ousley"));
• A petitioning creditor may be disqualified from issuing a bankruptcy notice by reason of a restraint imposed by order of a court on the property of a judgment debtor thereby removing her ability to pay, where the practical reality is that it prevents the debtor from paying the debt (Wiltshire-Smith v Mellor Olsson (1995) 57 FCR 572) ("Wiltshire-Smith ");
• The test is whether in the eyes of ordinary fairness in business it will be said that the order has in a business sense prevented the debtor from paying (Wiltshire-Smith; Boscolo v Botany Council [1996] FCA 897 ("Boscolo "));
• The fact that a court order or a creditor has made it more difficult to comply with the bankruptcy notice as opposed to preventing compliance is not sufficient (Ling v Enrobook Pty Ltd (1997) 74 FCR 19 ("Ling"));
• The debtor bears the onus of proving affirmatively that the claim in respect of which the bankruptcy notice was issued could and would have been paid but for the act or omission of the creditor or order of the court (Wiltshire-Smith (above)).
28 Pollak involved orders in the nature of a Mareva injunction made on an application by
the National Australia Bank over all of the respective respondent's property and assets. The
Bank issued a bankruptcy notice and subsequently a creditor's petition based on non
compliance with that bankruptcy notice.

-10-
29 After considering the body of case law his Honour concluded at [52] - [53] that:
"What was said in Ling, Ousley and Boscolo is to be applied. In my opinion, seen through the eyes of ordinary fairness in business, there is nothing in this order that in a business sense practically prevented Dr Pollakfrom paying the debt he owed to the Bank within 21 days of the bankruptcy notice being served upon him. I do not doubt that the existence of the Mareva injunction would have tended to make compliance with the bankruptcy notice more difficult. However, as the authorities make clear, this in itself does not provide a basis to say that execution of the judgment should be deemed to have been stayed. The mere existence of a Mareva injunction obtained by the judgment creditor is not conduct of such a nature by the Bank that it should be regarded as having prevented Dr Pollakfrom paying the debt he owed.
Further, Dr Pollak has not satisfied the onus he bears of proving that, in fact, in the way matters transpired, the Bank should be deemed by its conduct, in a practical business sense, to have prevented him from, or even to have materially hindered him in, paying the debt. There was no evidence that Dr Pollak had assets which he could have used to satisfy the debt. ... There was also no evidence to suggest that Dr Pollak would have been able to raise funds to meet the debt, subject to his dealing with his property in a certain manner, or that he had approached the Bank with a plan which would allow him to meet the debt, or that he had approached the Court to vary the notice requirement. Accordingly, this challenge to the validity of the bankruptcy notice, and/or to the justice of acceding to the petition founded upon that notice, fails. "
30 On the evidence before me in this matter I am not satisfied that the respondent could
and would have paid the debt in the absence of the injunction.
31 I have dealt with the respondent's ability to pay her debts above and have concluded
that she has not established that, irrespective of the existence of the injunction, she is able to
pay her debts. In considering the more limited question of the possible payment of the debt
founding the bankruptcy notice only, even taking into account a fully drawn line of credit and
the amount held in the solicitors trust account, the funds available to the respondent would
not have been sufficient to pay that debt. Prima facie, however, if the amount held in the

-11 -
Supreme Court was also included, the respondent may have had available sufficient funds, although only at the expense of the other creditors. However, the respondent has produced no evidence in relation to the amount said to be held in the Supreme Court, or anything to indicate that it would be available to her to use to pay the debt of the petitioning creditor. I am therefore reluctant to take it into account.
32 Further, as noted above, it seems that the respondent would not have been able to
support any increase in the use of her line of credit and there is no evidence to suggest that in
those circumstances she would have sought to do so. There is no evidence that the
respondent has at any time entered into discussions with the petitioning creditor (or any other
creditor) about variation of the injunctive orders to allow payment of the judgment debt or, at
least since July 2005, in the hope of reaching some arrangement regarding satisfaction of this
debt or other liabilities. She has deposed that in October 2006, just after she was served with
the bankruptcy notice and around the time of the commission of the act of bankruptcy, she
applied for a waiver of her debt to the petitioning creditor but there is no evidence of any
other step being taken by her at any time up to the hearing of the petition.
33 For these reasons I am of the view that the respondent has not established that she
could and would have paid the debt founding the bankruptcy notice in the absence of the
injunction. I am also not convinced that the terms of the injunctive orders in this case
prevented the payment of the debt by the respondent as opposed to making it more difficult.
34 The injunction in Pollak was said to apply until further order and restrained dealing
with assets without at least 19 days notice to the applicant bank. In contrast, in general terms
the effect of the orders in Ling was, until further order, to restrain the debtor from dealing
with, or permitting the dealing with, any of his assets in any way except by making certain
specified payments. The orders in Ling were obtained by a creditor other than the petitioning
creditor but remained in force at the time of the issue of the bankruptcy notice. They also
were found not to create an effective stay of execution of the judgment.
35 In the circumstances of this case, the injunction obtained on the application of the
creditor was more restrictive than that in Pollak, but as far as is relevant, not more restrictive
than in Ling. In addition the orders in this case specifically only apply until further order and
provide the parties with liberty to apply.

-12-
36 There is no evidence before me that the respondent has at any time applied pursuant
to that liberty to apply to vary or discharge the order so as to enable her to pay her debts or
some of her debts (see also comments by Raphael FM in Crown Diagnostic v Sood (No.2)
[2006] FMCA 265 at [12] affirmed on appeal by Gyles J in Sood v Crown Diagnostic
Imaging Pty Ltd [2006] FCA 1721 at [13]). There is also no evidence before me as to why
such an application was not made. (I note that counsel for the petitioning creditor has
indicated that it did not do so because it considered such action would have had no utility
given what it understood to be the financial position of the respondent.)
37 For these reasons, I am of the view that the respondent has not established either that
the injunction prevented her from paying the debt founding the bankruptcy notice or that she
could or would have paid it in the absence of the injunction. On the basis of the evidence
before me it is my view that the Mareva injunction does not operate as a stay of the judgment
and I am therefore satisfied that the requirements of s 52(1) of the Act have been met.
38 For the same reasons, I am also of the view that the actions of the petitioning creditor
in seeking the injunction and then some time later issuing a bankruptcy notice, in the
circumstances described above, do not constitute 'other sufficient cause' why a sequestration
order should not be made pursuant to s 52(2) of the Act.
OTHER ENFORCEMENT METHODS
39 However, in the notice setting out her grounds of opposition to the petition, the
respondent also alleged that a sequestration order should not be made as the petitioning
creditor had failed to use appropriate alternate means of recovery, such as debt recovery
mechanisms under State law. She deposed to her belief that the petitioning creditor was
using bankruptcy proceedings as an alternative method of debt recovery.
40 I am not persuaded that, having obtained a judgment, there is a hierarchy of recovery
proceedings that a creditor must work through before it is permissible to issue a bankruptcy
notice. Speaking generally, a creditor may elect to pursue a judgment by issuing one of the
proceedings available at law or may elect to issue bankruptcy proceedings. The institution of
proceedings is a decision for the creditor and it is not for a debtor to insist that a particular
type of recovery proceeding be pursued in preference to others (Slack v Bottoms English

-13-
Solicitors [2002] FCA 1445). The fact that speedier, cheaper and more effective remedies may be available to a petitioning creditor has been held not to constitute other sufficient cause why a sequestration order should not be made (Re Poulson; Exparte Hempenstall Bros Ltd (1929) 1 ABC 54). Indeed even a prior demand is not a statutory precondition for the issue of a valid bankruptcy notice based on a valid judgement of a court (Cavoli v Etl [2007] FCA 1191 per Heerey J at [18]).
41 It is true that the issue of a bankruptcy notice simply to put pressure on a recalcitrant
debtor who is otherwise solvent to pay a debt, rather than to genuinely invoke the insolvency
jurisdiction of the court may be an abuse of process amounting to other sufficient cause why
a sequestration order should not be made (Killoran v Duncan [1999] FCA 1574). However
there must be a real intention on the part of the petitioning creditor to use the process for
some purpose which is not legitimate (Rozenbes v Kronhill (1956) 95 CLR 407) and if there
is no evidence of this a court will not infer improper motive (Bride v KMG Hungerfords (A
Firm) [1998] FCA 412). There is no evidence before the Court in this case that there was any
such intention on the part of the petitioning creditor. There is also nothing before me to
indicate that at the time of issuing the bankruptcy notice the petitioning creditor knew or
contemplated that the debtor had the financial capacity to pay her debts. In fact counsel for
the petitioning creditor has stated that attempts by the petitioning creditor to obtain
information from the debtor as to her financial position were unsuccessful and, in the face of
what was on the public record as to her liabilities and financial circumstances, it is
unsurprising that a view might have been taken that she was not able to do so; a view this
Court has also reached.
42 On the evidence before me there is nothing to suggest that the bankruptcy
proceedings were issued as an alternative debt recovery proceeding or that there existed an
improper motive on the part of the petitioning creditor.
43 There has been no other suggestion of abuse of process by the petitioning creditor in
pursuing the sequestration order. Although the respondent deposed that she was not formally advised that her request for a waiver of her debt had been refused until after the issue of the creditor's petition (which I note was presented on the last date it could be presented in reliance on the act of bankruptcy committed on 18 October 2006), she did not suggest this

-14-
gave rise to a ground to dismiss the creditor's petition. To the extent that I need to consider it I am not satisfied that this provides 'other sufficient cause' to dismiss the petition.
44 Although I feel some sympathy for the situation in which the respondent now finds
herself, the question which I need to determine is whether or not a sequestration order should
be made pursuant to s 52 of the Act. I have taken into account the fact that the respondent
has represented herself and closely considered the possible relevance of all of the matters
which have been raised by her, but on the evidence before me, there is nothing which to my mind suggests that I should exercise my discretion not to make the sequestration order sought by the petitioning creditor.
45 I am satisfied that the debtor committed the act of bankruptcy alleged in the petition.
I am satisfied of the other matters required by s 52 of the Act. I am not satisfied that the
respondent has established that, pursuant to s 52(2) of the Act, she is able to pay her debts or that there is other sufficient cause why a sequestration order should not be made.

Counsel for the Applicant:
Solicitors for the Applicant:
The respondent appeared in person
Hearing Date:
Date for last submissions:
Date of Reasons for Decision:

N J Parkyn
Australian Government Solicitor
24 August 2007 14 September 2007 28 September 2007

*****

LETTERS FROM PARLIAMENTARIANS MAL BROUGH, JASON WOOD, JOE LUDWIG, LINDSAY TANNER

(Two constituents wrote to their local Federal Member, Mr Jason Wood, who got identical responses from Mal Brough):

Thank you for your letter of 9 July 2007 on behalf of Mr _ _ _ _ about Ms Dawn Rowan.

Ms Rowan's debt to the Commonwealth arose as a result of her taking legal action against a number of defendants, including the Commonwealth, alleging that she was owed damages because of negligence, defamation, misfeasance and conspiracy. The allegations were made in the context of a joint Commonwealth/State report on women's shelters in South Australia, the details of which were broadcast on television in August 1987.

The matter was dealt with in the first instance by a single judge of the Supreme Court of South Australia. However, the Commonwealth (and other defendants) successfully appealed this decision to the Full Court of the Supreme Court of South Australia, who found that there was no legal basis to support Ms Rowan's allegations. The court made an in-principle decision that costs be awarded against Ms Rowan to compensate the Commonwealth (and other defendants) for reasonable expenses involved in defending the matter.

Ms Rowan then applied for special leave lo appeal that decision to the High Court of Australia. The High Court decided that leave should not be granted on the basis that Ms Rowan's case did not have reasonable prospects of success. The High Court emphasised that its role is to judge on untested general legal principles rather than to reverse a costs judgment in a particular case.

Generally, in circumstances where the Commonwealth considers that an applicant does not have reasonable prospects of success the Commonwealth can, in accordance with the Legal Services Directions 2005, invite the applicant to discontinue the legal proceedings in return for the Commonwealth not secking costs against the applicant. The Commonwealth docs this in the interest of avoiding the inevitable cost to all parties that are associated with the continuance of unjustified litigation. However, as you would understand, an applicant has a right to pursue legal avenues, notwithstanding any views the Commonwealth might offer and this is a decision for the applicant to take. Where an applicant refuses to discontinue legal proceedings, and rejects such an offer, the Commonwealth is left with no alternative but to pursue the recovery of costs.

The issue of costs was, in this case, determined by the Full Court of the Supreme Court of South Australia, in a separate judgment, after Ms Rowan had exhausted her avenues of appeal. The court awarded the Commonwealth $380,000 in costs. In coming to its decision. the court stated:

"We think that there is sufficient information upon which the court can conclude that a figure of $380.000 is logical, fair and reasonable ".

Under the Financial Management and Accountability Act /997, the Commonwealth is required to pursue payment of debts that are due to it, including debts that arise under costs orders of a court. In such circumstances. the Commonwealth must take whatever steps are appropriate to ensure that moneys due to it are paid to the greatest extent possible and returned to the Consolidated Revenue. While the Commonwealth may explore a range of options to obtain payment of a debt, in some situations this can only be done through legal action.

I am aware that Ms Rowan has made a number of public statements, including on her website, in relation to the Commonwealth's handling of this matter. For privacy reasons, I am not able to discuss the particular aspects of Ms Rowan's case which are not on the public record. However, I can say that in dealing with any matter involving the recovery of a debt, the Commonwealth is required to comply with a comprehensive legislative and policy framework, which is designed to treat debtors in a fair and reasonable manner.

In particular, the Commonwealth is required to comply with the principles set out in the Legal Services Directions 1005, including the requirement to behave as a model litigant. In this particular case, the Commonwealth complied with those principles. In accordance with the Legal Services Directions, the Commonwealth will, wherever possible and appropriate, endeavour to settle matters without the need for court proceedings. However, where satisfactory resolution cannot be achieved, it is sometimes necessary to seek the determination of the courts.

Once again, thank you for writing on Mr _ _ _ 's behalf. I trust my comments are of assistance.

Yours sincerely

MAL BROUGH

*****

Here's an informed response from Bob Moles, a legal expert in the area of miscarriages of justice, and author of A State of Injustice reproduced here with his permission:

I find the response by the Minister to be particularly disappointing.

It fails to have regard to the equity, justice and substantial merits of the case which were all in favour of Dawn Rowan.

It is particularly disappointing that the Minister refers to the duty to act as a "model litigant".

If regard had been had to that issue from the outset, this matter would never have occurred, and Ms Rowan's reputation would never have been put in question.

Let me know if you require something more,

Best wishes to all,

Bob

Dr Robert N Moles
Networked Knowledge
http://netk.net.au

****

The Hon. Philip Ruddock
Attorney-General
Parliament House
CANBERRA ACT 2600
14 June 2007
Dear Attorney

I refer to the case of Dawn Rowan, whose plight was recently highlighted in the
Today Tonight on 14 May 2007, and whose case I'm sure of which you have been
made aware.

After the broadcasting of that report, I have been contacted by a number of
constituents who are now concerned about the Commonwealth's role in the case.
As I understand the matter, Ms Rowan as a self-represented litigant joined the
Commonwealth as a defending party in her action against the South Australian
Government.

While the Commonwealth should not reward speculative litigation, I am concerned by
the implication in the reports that Ms Rowan's home is to be seized in lieu of payment of the Commonwealth's costs which were awarded against Ms Rowan.

In order to respond to these concerns, I therefore seek further detail from your office and the Department as to:
Firstly, whether this action is presently subject to further appeal (if so, I note you may not be able to provide advice on the questions following).
Secondly, whether the Commonwealth has, in fact, made a final determination on to
seizure of Ms Rowan's assets, and if so, what that decision is.
Thirdly, whether or not Ms Rowan is entitled to damages from other defendants in the
case, and whether consideration has been given to seizure of these funds.
Finally, whether or not a cost-benefit analysis has been performed on recovery of
costs from Ms Rowan.
I thank you for your consideration of this matter. I look forward to your early
response.
Kind Regards
Senator Joe Ludwig

*From: *"Tanner, Lindsay (MP)" >
*Date: *9 October 2007 9:33:33 AM

*Subject: **Dawn Rowan*

Dear _ _ _ _

Thank you for your email of 2 October 2007 concerning Dawn Rowan.

I have received similar correspondence from another of my constituents earlier this year. I am able to inform you that representations have been made by our Shadow Attorney General Joe Ludwig to the appropriate Ministers (as the parties seeking to recover costs in the case), Attorney General Phillip Ruddock and The Minister for Community Services, Mal Brough. A query to Senator Ludwig’s office yesterday confirmed that there has as yet been no reply. I have attached a copy of the text of this letter for your information.

In addition to this I referred my constituent’s concerns about Ms Rowan’s situation to The Member for McEwen, Fran Bailey who is now Ms Rowan’s local member and hence the other most appropriate Member of Parliament to make representations on her behalf.

Yours truly,

Lindsay Tanner
Shadow Minister for Finance Federal Member for Melbourne

www.lindsaytanner.com

*****

A friend sent this article, from The Australian:

Judges too timid for hard cases: Kirby

October 11, 2007

THE High Court's "great dissenter", Michael Kirby, has taken a swipe at his fellow judges by suggesting they are too timid to make the signature decisions taken by the court in the 1990s.

Delivering the 10th annual Hawke Lecture in Adelaide last night - honouring the former Labor prime minister - Justice Kirby posed the rhetorical question whether today's court would rule the same way on the Mabo and Wik native title cases, among other landmark decisions that tested the limits of judicial activism under then chief justice Sir Anthony Mason.

His answer: "Probably not." More...

LETTERS FROM FEDERAL MPs JOE LUDWIG AND LINDSAY TANNER

The Hon. Philip Ruddock
Attorney-General
Parliament House
CANBERRA ACT 2600

14 June 2007

Dear Attorney

I refer to the case of Dawn Rowan, whose plight was recently highlighted in the
Today Tonight on 14 May 2007, and whose case I'm sure of which you have been
made aware.

After the broadcasting of that report, I have been contacted by a number of
constituents who are now concerned about the Commonwealth's role in the case.
As I understand the matter, Ms Rowan as a self-represented litigant joined the
Commonwealth as a defending party in her action against the South Australian
Government.

While the Commonwealth should not reward speculative litigation, I am concerned by
the implication in the reports that Ms Rowan's home is to be seized in lieu of payment of the Commonwealth's costs which were awarded against Ms Rowan.

In order to respond to these concerns, I therefore seek further detail from your office and the Department as to:

Firstly, whether this action is presently subject to further appeal (if so, I note you may not be able to provide advice on the questions following).

Secondly, whether the Commonwealth has, in fact, made a final determination on to
seizure of Ms Rowans assets, and if so, what that decision is.

Thirdly, whether or not Ms Rowan is entitled to damages from other defendants in the
case, and whether consideration has been given to seizure of these funds.

Finally, whether or not a cost-benefit analysis has been performed on recovery of
costs from Ms Rowan.

I thank you for your consideration of this matter. I look forward to your early
response.

Kind Regards
Senator Joe Ludwig

*****

*From: *"Tanner, Lindsay (MP)"
*Date: *9 October 2007 9:33:33 AM
*To: *
*Subject: **Dawn Rowan*

Dear Reverend Nettleton,

Thank you for your email of 2 October 2007 concerning Dawn Rowan.

I have received similar correspondence from another of my constituents earlier this year. I am able to inform you that representations have been made by our Shadow Attorney General Joe Ludwig to the appropriate Ministers (as the parties seeking to recover costs in the case), Attorney General Phillip Ruddock and The Minister for Community Services, Mal Brough. A query to Senator Ludwig’s office yesterday confirmed that there has as yet been no reply. I have attached a copy of the text of this letter for your information.

In addition to this I referred my constituent’s concerns about Ms Rowan’s situation to The Member for McEwen, Fran Bailey who is now Ms Rowan’s local member and hence the other most appropriate Member of Parliament to make representations on her behalf.

Yours truly,

Lindsay Tanner
Shadow Minister for Finance Federal Member for Melbourne

www.lindsaytanner.com

VIDEOS OF TODAY TONIGHT AUGUST 23 & 24

August 23


August 24

AN ALTERNATIVE LEGAL PARADIGM

Here are two articles -pro and con - re the legal theory underlining the approach Dawn is taking in her case. Googling 'artificial person' 'strawman' 'ALL CAPITAL LETTERS' 'redemption process' 'immemorial common law' 'UCC' etc. will provide a fairly comprehensive bunch of articles on the subject: pro and con in terms of conspiracy theories about it all.

Here's an article whose URL I misplaced (anyone able to find it?):

1. Understanding My "Straw Man" & The "Redemption In Law" Process

(I am attempting to adapt the information from the book: Redemption In Law - see advertisement at the end of this document - so that it might be applicable to myself as a Canadian living in Canada. This exercise is twofold, firstly to permit me to better understand this new information and secondly to stimulate those who may choose to read it to be motivated to further reasearch the background information as it applies to their respective "straw man" and then take action to re-capture their "straw man.")

I telephoned Industry Canada on (October 25, 2000) to inquire about how I could proceed with a UCC Search Request and about geting the UCC - 1 form for the Financing Statment. After being passed along to four people someone called me back and left a message saying: "Could you explain a little more about UCC." It seems that either they do NOT know about UCC or else they do not want to tell me about it.
Thomas-Joseph: Kennedy

Having knowledge of the Statutes and Codes of Louisiana is necessary to understanding the Redemption In Law process. The basic premis to fully understanding my straw man and the "Redemption In Law" process is the fact that the (Uniform Commercial Code) UCC - 1 Financing Statement is the only unbreakable contract in the world. This new process of "Redemption In Law" is in its infant stages and as successes continue to occur, the authors of the book will continue to offer new suggestions as to the optimal actions to take as we seek to redeem or re-capture our respective straw man.

The second premis that comes into play is that since the UCC is the ultimate foundation, the bedrock, upon which the world's commerce functions, it follows that there are severe penalties for fraud in commerce. This becomes very significant when we learn that all commerce functions through straw men. I, Thomas-Joseph: Kennedy (as the real being) sign for accommodation on behalf of my straw man every time I sign a document.

All areas of government and all alleged "courts of law" are de facto, "colour of law and right" institutions. Our "courts of law" only recognize and deal with other legal persons. This is why my lawful name is never entered in their records. The all-caps legal person is used. Likewise, jurisdiction in our "courts of law" covers only other artificial persons. The proper jurisdiction for a lawful being is a Constitutionally sanctioned, common-law-venue court. Unfortunately, such jurisdiction has been shelved and is no longer available; the only courts in Canada today are statutory courts.

My straw man is an artificial person created by law at my birth on September 1, 1948 via the inscription of an ALL-CAPITAL LETTERS NAME on my birth certificate/document, which is a document of title and a negotiable instrument. My lawful, Christian name of birthright was replaced with a legal, corporate name of deceit and fraud. I, Thomas-Joseph: Kennedy have been answering when the legal person, KENNEDY, THOMAS JOSEPH, is addressed, and therefore the two have been recognized as being one and the same. When, I, Thomas-Joseph: Kennedy, the lawful being distinguish myself as another party than the legal person, the two will be separated.

My STATE-created birth certificate with an all-caps name became a document evidencing debt the moment it was issued. Once the Federal Government of Canada registered my birth certificate with the Department of Industry Trade and Commerce, that Department notified the Treasury Department, which took out a loan from the private Bank of Canada. The Treasury used the loan to purchase a bond from the Department of Industry Trade and Commerce which investsed the sale proceeds in the stock or bond market. The Treasury Department then issued Treasury securities in the form Treasury Bonds, Notes, and Bills using the bonds as surety for the new "securities." This cycle is based on the future tax revenues of the legal person KENNEDY, THOMAS JOSEPH, whose name appears on the birth certificate. This also means that the bankrupt, corporate Canada guaranteed to the purchasers of their securities my lifetime labour and tax revenues with my birth certificate as collateral for payment. This device was craftily initiated simply by converting the lawful, true name of Thomas-Jospeh: Kennedy as a newborn into a legal, juristic name of a person, KENNEDY, THOMAS JOSEPH.

Legally, since September 1, 1948, I have been considered a slave or indentured servant to the various federal, provincial and municipal governments via my STATE-issued, STATE-created birth certificate in the name of my all-caps person. My birth certificate was issued so that the issuer could claim "exclusive" title to the legal person cteated thereby. This was further compounded when I voluntarily obtained a driver's license and a SIN (Social Insurance Number). The state even owns my personal and private life through my STATE-issued marriage license/certificate issued in the all-caps names. I have had no rights in birth, marriage, nor will I have them even in death unless I re-capture my straw man. (The names on tombstones in cemeteries are in all-caps.) The STATE holds title to my legal person it created via my birth certificate, until Thomas-Joseph: Kennedy, the rightful owner, the holder in due course of the instrument, that is myself, reclaims/redeems it.

The main problem is that I have voluntarily (though unknowingly) agreed to this contrived system of plunder by remaining silent and failing to assert my absolute rights. Therefore, the maxim of law becomes crucially operative: "He who fails to assert his rights has none." The legal rules and codes enforce themselves. There are no court hearings to determine if those rules are correct. Their "law" is self-regulating and self-supporting. Once set into motion, their "laws" automatically come into effect provided the legal process has been followed.

My straw man has a ficticious name written in a manner not provided for in the rules of English grammar. My straw man has a same-sounding name as Thomas-Joseph: Kennedy, but is artificial and exists only by the force of or in contemplation of law. My straw man is a distinct legal entity that benefits the creator - the Government of Canada - because the creator can then accomplish things in the name of my straw man that would not otherwise be permitted e.g. secretly acquire property etc. My straw man is: KENNEDY, THOMAS JOSEPH. The Government of Canada has been using my straw man for the purpose of siphoning off wealth from myself, an otherwise sovereign man and conveying the proceeds to its credtors, the private Bank of Canada and the IMF. It is my intention to now use my straw man for my benefit, rather than continuing to be enslaved and abused because of it.

Under the Uniform Commercial Code, my straw man is defined as, and serves as, a "transmitting utility." The operators/controllers of the policical/economic/industrial system have set it up so that the only way for Thomas-Joseph: Kennedy to access the industrial goods and services of the nation of Canada is through a nominal third party, a front man, a dummy, a public corporation of one, a corporately coloured juristic person, a straw man - a utility through which said goods and services may be transmitted. This means that the only way that Thomas-Joseph: Kennedy can acquire goods and services is through my straw man. I cannot keep my body alive and survive in the world today without the industrial goods and services of the nation of Canada, so I have been forced to interface through my straw man in order to partake of them. Because my straw man has no body, and because I am the one actually benefitting from the consumptions/use of the industrial goods and services of the nation and because, (prior to Redemption) I do not hold title to my straw man, I am the one responsible for discharging the public liability associated with the "benefits" that come to you in the name of my straw man.

The "purpose not otherwise permitted" is "extraction of income tax from a sovereign" that is myself - something I would not knowingly agree to. All "income" is "corporate income," and my straw man is a dummy public corporation. Because my straw man is registered (my birth certificate), and because I cannot work for another except through my labour license (Social Insurance Number) or have a bank account except through my Social Insurance Number, taxes have been relatively easy to monitor, assess and collect from Thomas-Jospeh: Kennedy. All claims made against me, whether civil or criminal, are instituted in the name of my straw man, the title to which is currently held by the Government of Canada. Accordingly, upon acquiring legal title to my straw man, I will have the capacity to protect my interests so that no one can come against Thomas-Joseph: Kennedy via my straw man and a perfect claim.

I am considering that it is possible that the Department of Industry Trade and Commerce (or some other Department) of the Federal Government of Canada acquired my Birth Certificate via the City of Kingston in the County of Lennox and Addington and the Province of Ontario, which in turn accepted it from my parents, who unwittingly pledged me, Thomas-Joseph: Kennedy to the "state" and delivered me into bondage, slavery, and the status of being chattel property in a state of permanently indentured servitude. The Department of Industry Trade and Commerce became the de facto holder of the Certificate of Rights to my body, labour, and property and gave me a claim check, a pawn receipt, a warehouse receipt, a certificate of deposit - a birth certificate. Whoever the holder of my Birth Certificate may now be has no more right to it than a pawnbroker holding a possesion for me in my absence and awaiting my return to claim it, to redeem it.

The current holder of my Birth Certificate is able to capitalize on it because of my inaction and silence, that is, my failure to instruct the said holder otherwise.When I accept for value, my Birth Certificate I reacquire title and regain my crown - I reinstall myself on my own throne. I regain dominion and sovereignty over my own kingdom.

I have learned that there are only two classes of people in our modern Canada, as well as in all legal proceeedings: creditors and debtors. Once I have established my sovereignty in law I become the creditor, and any adverse party in dispute with me is registered to the inferior status of debtor. As long as I fail to establish my sovereignty in law, I do not hold title to anything in my life, I have no, legal capacity and I am devoid of standing to assert any rights, that is, I remain a permanent debtor, and I must always lose in any dispute with the system for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Reclaiming title to my straw man acts as a bar, or estoppel, to any and all comers. If I fail to reclaim rights to title of my straw man by filling a (Universal Commercial Code) UCC - 1 making me the creditor and absolute ruler of my straw man, I will not be sovereign and I will lose at resolution of any dispute.

When I establish my sovereignty and self-ownership in law via a UCC - 1 Financing Statement, my entire life will be dramatically affected. I simpy become the sovereign, rather than a hopeless debtor and chattel property.

In summary, the State (in any aspect, any jurisdiction, any country, any culture, any time) can act against me via my straw man only if said State holds title to my straw man by virtue of my failure to redeem the document of title, the Birth Certificate, to the straw man. My failure to do so constitutes assent to the presumption that the State is the de facto owner and holder of the title to my straw man.

The most powerful contract in the world is a UCC - 1 Financing Statement, which is impenetrable and the foundation of all commerce. The UCC - 1 Financing Statement currently in place against my life, my labour, and all my property was established by illegitimate presumption. That I have failed to rebut this presumption is the reason that I am in the scarcity mess that I am in today.

The security instrument is my Birth Certificate. The bankers presently hold title. I am the collateral. This can happen only by ommission/failure to rebut my presumption of security interest in everything associated with the debtor - KENNEDY, THOMAS JOSEPH.

The bankers have conquered and enslaved the world only because of the ignorance, apathy, and default of each slave - including myself. This is a free-will universe. The unit of experience, choice, rights, and sovereignty is each individual like myself. I am the a unique being in the universe with the right, knowledge, or duty to speak for myself; no one else can assert my rights for me. It I fail to assert my rights, I have tacitly agreed to be a slave, subject to the whims of my masters.

It is of utmost importance to understand that the bankers' claim of a security interest in everything associated with my straw man via my Birth Certificate is by presumption only, and stands only because of your failure to rebut it. Filing a UCC - 1 Financing Statement against my straw man absolutely rebuts any presumption of a valid claim against my straw man by anyone other than myself, while at the same time itself being unrebuttable. There are many reasons for this, the most crucial being:

1. Any substantiation of a bona fide contract between me and the usurpers of my throne is impossible because there never was a bona fide contract due to absence of true agreement based upon the interaction being devoid of full disclosure, geneuine meeting of minds, and mutual good faith.

2. I am, and therefore, I am correclty presumed in law (all law, including theirs), to be the foundation, originm and unit of sovereignty. Whatver I choose to do or not to do is presumed to be (and always is) so by my free choice. If I fail to rebut my presumption that I am subject to their system they possess the grounds to presume that I chose to act as I did, with full knowledge of the law, in the free will manner that I did. Conversely, the same philosophy that has worked against me can work for me when I rebut their preumption and redeem my sovereign capacity.

If the real me (Thomas-Joseph: Kennedy, secured party) has the supreme claim against the artificial me (KENNEDY, THOMAS JOSEPH, my straw man, my debtor), the system cannot perfect a claim against either (my straw man or my real and lawful name of Christian birthright); my straw man because I hold the supreme claim thereon; my real self because the system - another straw man - can deal only with other like entities i.e. other straw men.

More to come .....Readers are invited to share any knowledege that they may have acquired from self-imposed courses of study re: the "strawman."

A fellow New Zealander patriot, Richard Roland Riley, Esquire has posted some information at his website about the legal theory of the straw man in New Zealend. To read what he has written visit this URL: http://www.zolatimes.com/astrawman.html

Some UCC information is posted at this URL: www.law.cornell.edu/ucc/ucc.table.html
Redemption in Law (highly recommended)
(New Second Edition)
July 2000
Theory and Practice
"Cracking the Code"

The hottest book in America Today!
Discover how your govermentally-created, ALL-CAPITAL LETTERS-WRITTEN NAME, which is a corrupted, non-standard English version of your true name and compromises you with an entirely separate legal entity that-is used by banks, government agencies, and corporations to attack and exploit you legally and financially. Learn hot to get yourself proofed up against such legal predators and commercial pirates, who would come after you merely because you did not undertand the enourmous legals significance between your true name (intial letters only capitalized) and your name in ALL-CAPITAL LETTERS. This book contains practical information about the biggest breakthrough in commercial and legal freedom to come along in the last 6,000 years. The architects of this master plan never expected that their secret would ever be discovered.book $125.00 (US Funds)


Redemption in Law To purchase from the website Click Here

Audio Tapes Available!
Five 90 minute audio tapes
by the book publisher.
Explaining from A to Z
the whole story!
Temporarily must be ordered
by mail only!
$35.00 (US Funds)
Check or MO. to:
The BBC of America
19528 Ventura Blvd.,
PMB 449
Tarzana, CA. 91356
YOU NEED THESE TAPES!!

*****

2. And for a contra article visit
http://home.hiwaay.net/~becraft/NamesInCaps.htm

Rowland Croucher

DIAMOND VALLEY LEADER ARTICLE

Here's an excellent article in the local paper distributed throughout Dawn's area of north-east Melbourne.

Congratulations Fiona!

~~~

Diamond Valley Leader, Edition 1 - DVV
WED 27 JUN 2007, Page 005
Pursuit towards bankruptcy

A ST ANDREWS counsellor who fought a David and Goliath court battle to
clear her name is now on the brink of losing everything she owns.
After a 20-year battle, the Federal Government is threatening to
bankrupt Dawn Rowan to recoup court costs of $397,000.
Ms Rowan, 61, successfully sued the South Australian and federal
governments and two television stations for defamation in 2002,
following the publication of a damning report into a women's shelter she
helped run in the 1980s.
But in 2004 the parties appealed and all were cleared except the South
Australian Government.
Ms Rowan is now legally liable to pay court costs for the Federal
Government and television stations ABC and Network 10.
The television stations have not pursued her for costs, but the Federal
Government has filed a bankruptcy claim against her for $380,000. It is
also claiming a further $17,000 for costs associated with the bankruptcy
proceedings.
Ms Rowan now fears she will lose her home and livelihood when she faces
a bankruptcy hearing at the Federal Magistrates' Court in Adelaide next
month.
``When I started this, I knew I could lose everything but I never
thought I would lose everything if I won,'' Ms Rowan said.
She has set up a postcard campaign, hoping public backing will encourage
the Federal Government to drop its demand for money.
Prominent Melbourne QC Julian Burnside, who has reviewed Ms Rowan's
case, said the Government's pursuit of the money was ``pretty
miserable''.
``If an ordinary citizen sued and succeeded, it would be understandable
they would want their costs paid,'' Mr Burnside said.
``But you would think trying to shake money out of her would be of low
priority for the Commonwealth Government.''
If she is made bankrupt on July 5, Ms Rowan's 20-year fight will be
over.
``I will be homeless, and I work from home, so I will have nothing,''
she said.
Ms Rowan said public support was now her only hope.
Supporters are sending postcards calling on Attorney-General Phillip
Ruddock to drop the bankruptcy action.
The Attorney-General's Office referred Leader to the Department of
Families, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs.
In a statement, the department said that ``under the Financial
Management and Accountability Act 1997, the Commonwealth
is legally obliged to recover
outstanding debts, including court costs awarded against litigants''.
* Dawn's battle for justice: Pages 12-13.


------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------
Caption: Dawn Rowan stands to lose her St Andrews house, and her ability
to run a business from home, when she faces a bankruptcy hearing next
month.
Illus: Photo
IllusBy: Picture: MARK FRECKER N52DV350
Section: NEWS




Diamond Valley Leader
Diamond Valley Leader, Edition 1 - DVV
WED 27 JUN 2007, Page 012


Legal fight takes toll
Pictures: Mark Frecker


IT'S hard to spot the chinks in Dawn Rowan's armour.
The St Andrews counsellor is a fighter in every sense of the
word.
Her determined battle against domestic violence in the 1980s turned into
a gruelling battle against South Australia and the Commonwealth that has
spanned two decades.
And after more than 20 years of fighting, Ms Rowan is set to lose
everything she has fought for.
With a bankruptcy hearing pending next month, the 61-year-old feels as
though the battle has finally broken her.
``Basically I don't get out of bed these days unless I have to,'' Ms
Rowan said.
``I can't recover from this.''
After years of controversy, public humiliation and vicious court
battles, Ms Rowan has no remaining family, no partner, few friends and
only $40,000 in superannuation.
If the bankruptcy order is successful, she will be forced on to the
streets.
Ms Rowan has been driven by a need to seek justice. But she never
guessed the road would be so long or hard as it has been.
Ms Rowan's legal fight began in 1987, when she worked at Christies Beach
Women's Shelter in Adelaide. The then South Australian community welfare
minister Dr John Cornwall ordered an independent review by a joint state
and federal committee into the state's women's shelters.
The report, Shelters in the Storm, released in August 1987, contained
anonymous claims of physical, sexual and verbal harassment of Christies
Beach clients, as well as intimidation, inappropriate counselling
practices, professional negligence and misappropriation of funds.
Despite a police investigation and subsequent parliamentary review
finding no wrong-doing, Christies Beach was closed on September 4, 1987.

WITH her professional and personal reputation in tatters, Ms Rowan
quickly moved to Victoria.
After a ``deafening silence'' from most of her old friends, the formerly
sociable woman became extremely depressed and withdrawn.
``When you get dumped with this kind of scandal, people steer clear of
you,'' she said.
In 1990, Ms Rowan decided to take action against the report that had
effectively ``destroyed'' her.
She filed lawsuits against the South Australian government, the
Commonwealth, Network Ten and the ABC, which had interviewed committee
head Judith Roberts about the allegations.
In 2002, South Australian Supreme Court Justice Bruce Debelle said the
allegations were a ``shocking defamation'' and ruled all defendants
liable.
Ms Rowan was awarded total compensation of $585,000, most of which paid
her legal bills.
Following a successful appeal in the Full Court of the Supreme Court in
November 2004, the Federal Government demanded Ms Rowan pay court costs.
It obtained an injunction against her in August 2005 and her assets were
frozen.
The Government is pursuing her for more than $380,000 the value of her
St Andrews house.
In her back garden, overlooking the suburb's bushland, Ms Rowan speaks
of her journey's end. She doesn't expect to enjoy this sight for much
longer.
``I don't know who will feed the birds when I'm gone,'' she said,
throwing bird seed at a growing flock of feathered friends.
Friends are a rare commodity these days. But those she has have shown
solid support for her cause, particularly her counsellor, the Rev
Rowland Croucher, who has stood firmly beside her since they met six
years ago. He believes the Federal Government is ``cruel'' to pursue her
for the costs.
The two have started a postcard campaign, believing public support is
the only way Ms Rowan will win her final battle.
To join the campaign, email dawn.rowan@optusnet.com.au.
* What do you think? Email diamondvalley@leadernewspapers.com .au.

Caption: Dawn Rowan believes a postcard campaign to Attorney-General
Phillip Ruddock is her only hope of keeping her house and business.
Illus: Photo
IllusBy: N52DV350
Section: NEWS

WED 27 JUN 2007, Page 013


SEPTEMBER 1981: Dawn Rowan starts work at Christies Beach Women's
Shelter in Adelaide.She becomes a prominent advocate for women's
shelters, lobbying for more funding.
OCTOBER 1986: Women's shelters call for the then community welfare
minister Dr John Cornwall's Father of the Year award to be revoked
because he will not increase funding for shelters. Dr Cornwall announces
an independent review into shelters, headed by Judith Roberts.
AUGUST 11, 1987: Dr Cornwall announces in SA Parliament that he is
withdrawing funding to Christies Beach because of allegations in the
Shelters in the Storm report.
SEPTEMBER 1987: Ms Rowan loses her job, Christies Beach Shelter is
closed down and she moves to Victoria.
1990: Ms Rowan files lawsuits against 13 defendants from the state and
federal governments, Network Ten (then Channel 7) and the ABC both of
which broadcast interviews with Ms Roberts for defamation, negligence
and misfeasance (abuse of public office), claiming the report has ruined
her professional and personal reputation.
JUNE 2001: The court hearing starts.
JUNE 21, 2002: Supreme Court Justice Bruce Debelle finds the
governments, Network Ten and the ABC guilty of defamation and awards Ms
Rowan a total of $585,000. He finds Ms Roberts and two other review
committee members acted with malice, and Dr Cornwall guilty of
misfeasance.
NOVEMBER 2004: The Full Court of the Supreme Court overturns Justice
Debelle's finding of defamation against the television stations and the
federal government. The ruling of defamation against state government
defendants is upheld, but the finding of malice is overturned.
APRIL 2005: The court finds Ms Rowan liable for the court costs of the
cleared parties. She is also ordered to pay back more than $65,000 in
previously awarded damages.
AUGUST 2005: The High Court refuses to allow Ms Rowan's appeal.
APRIL 2006: Commonwealth Government asks for more than $600,000 in
costs. South Australian Supreme Court orders Ms Rowan to pay $380,000,
the value of her house.
AUGUST 2006: Ms Rowan is unable to pay and the Commonwealth orders a
creditor's petition to the Federal Magistrates' Court in South
Australia, seeking for her to be made bankrupt.


------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------
Section: NEWS
Fiona Willan

Journalist

Diamond Valley Leader

DAWN ROWAN PICS - FROM CHANNEL 7

9


8

7

6

5

4

3

2

1

EXPLANATION

This Blog has been set up as part of a group of Blogs produced by me, Rowland Croucher.

That's why you'll see my biodata here, not Dawn Rowan's.

Hopefully, when Dawn has been freed from this tyrannous situation, she'll have the mental space to manage this Blog herself. But Jan and I are committed to supporting her through this whole ordeal.

See the initial story we published, for info about how we met Dawn.

She's a very courageous person, and I would encourage all Australians who read this to communicate with their federal parliamentary representatives to advocate for Dawn.

Shalom!/Salaam!

Rowland Croucher

P.S. This Blog grew out of an older one, which was then replaced by the Dawn Rowan Saga Blog (http://dawnrowansaga.blogspot.com/). For the record, here's the material which appeared on the original Blog:

Thursday, May 24, 2007
NEW BLOG

Dear friends,

It's now Friday morning (whatever the date and time you read on this Blog) and we've just heard that the bankruptcy hearing set for Monday 28th may be postponed. Dawn and I - Rowland - have already purchased tickets to fly to Adelaide. This is the way Dawn has been, to use an expression well-known to Australians 'mucked around' for 20 years.

We'll keep you posted.

Meanwhile, we've set up a new blog with a new template, layout and title here:
http://dawnrowansaga.blogspot.com/

Please add this to your favorites, and watch regularly for developments.

Rowland Croucher
Posted by Rowland Croucher at 6:23 PM 0 comments
Labels: New Blog
Sunday, May 20, 2007
UPDATE: MAY 20, 2007


***** BANKRUPTCY HEARING *****


The Commonwealth Government is enforcing bankruptcy - proceedings to be held in Adelaide Monday may 28th. the S.A. Government is joining the fray to destroy Dawn, and will at the same time petition to claim costs against her.

An offer has been made via Dawn's lawyer to forestall this drastic procedure, but so far no response...

Urgent: please contact the Prime Minister - the Hon John Howard MP

Tel: (02) 6277 7700 Fax: (02) 6273 4100
email: http://www.pm.gov.au/contact/index.cfm

and/or the attorney-general, Hon. Philip Ruddock at
ag@ag.gov.au


~~~

HERE'S THE EMAIL I'VE JUST SENT TO THE PRIME MINISTER (and COPIED TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL):

THE HON. JOHN HOWARD
PRIME MINISTER
COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA

20th May 2007

Re: Dawn Rowan

I wish to draw to your attention a gross injustice perpetrated by the Governments of South Australia and the Commonwealth against a citizen declared at all times in the court process to be innocent.

The Commonwealth and SA governments are now pursuing her for costs, whilst the perpetrators of the injustice against Ms Rowan will not suffer personally in any way.

Please visit http://dawnrowan.blogspot.com/
or
http://jmm.aaa.net.au/articles/4728.htm
or
Channel 7's TT program of May 14, 2007 (link on front page http://jmm.aaa.net.au)
for a summary of her case.

A bankruptcy hearing against Ms Rowan is set down for next Monday, May 28th May, 2007. If it succeeds she will be homeless and destitute.

I respectfully request that your government exercise compassion and clemency in this case of a gross miscarriage of justice against an innocent person.

Yours faithfully

(Rev. Dr.) Rowland Croucher

~~~
Posted by Rowland Croucher at 12:48 AM 0 comments
Labels: 2007, BANKRUPTCY, May 20
Tuesday, May 1, 2007
AN EXPLANATORY NOTE


This Blog has been set up as part of a group of Blogs produced by me, Rowland Croucher.

That's why you'll see my biodata here, not Dawn Rowan's.

Hopefully, when Dawn has been freed from this tyrannous situation, she'll have the mental space to manage this Blog herself. But Jan and I are committed to supporting her through this whole ordeal.

See the initial story we published, for info about how we met Dawn.

She's a very courageous person, and I would encourage all Australians who read this to communicate with their federal parliamentary representatives to advocate for Dawn.

Shalom!/Salaam!

Rowland Croucher

Monday, April 30, 2007
UPDATE MAY 1, 2007


Dear friends

Thanks for all the wonderful support you have provided over these 'lean years' of litigation.

The Federal Government (Philip Ruddock) are now proceeding to bankrupt me... a completely innocent citizen, grossly abused under parliamentary privilege, grossly defamed, who fought for 21 years to get justice -- and has been at all times declared innocent by the judgments, (which are on the public record).

This political action will leave me homeless, penniless, at 61 years of age, having worked for 40 years and supported myself throughout my life.

My total 'legal' costs, as permitted by the legal system (an actual joke!) have amounted to approximately $800,000, paid upfront/already. My actual costs of running the legal action for the past 17 years is 1 1/2 million dollars (not including lost earnings).

In relation to the Commonwealth's pursing me to bankruptcy, a recent communication from Philip Ruddock stated 'The Commonwealth is entitled to act firmly and properly to protect ***ITS*** (my emphasis) interests.'
Question: Whose interests is the Australian Government elected to represent????

The emotional cost of the last 21 years of torture includes severe post-traumatic stress symptoms, as documented in medical records which I'll post here in the near future.

Dawn Rowan
[dawn.rowan[at]optusnet.com.au]

PO Box 60,
St. Andrews,
Victoria,
Australia 3761

May 1. 2007


Posted by Rowland Croucher at 7:52 PM 0 comments
Labels: 2007, May 1
TOWARDS A DICTATORSHIP IN 10 EASY STEPS


[Australian readers might like to read this through Australian eyes and 'tick the boxes'.

Federal election 2007: what are you willing to do about it? Dawn Rowan].

~~~

Towards a Dictatorship in 10 easy steps

Naomi Wolf " (Guardian)
Tuesday April 24, 2007 [Posted here 1 May 2007]

Last autumn, there was a military coup in Thailand. The leaders of the coup took a number of steps, rather systematically, as if they had a shopping list. In a sense, they did. Within a matter of days, democracy had been closed down: the coup leaders declared martial law, sent armed soldiers into residential areas, took over radio and TV stations, issued restrictions on the press, tightened some limits on travel, and took certain activists into custody.

They were not figuring these things out as they went along. If you look at history, you can see that there is essentially a blueprint for turning an open society into a dictatorship. That blueprint has been used again and again in more and less bloody, more and less terrifying ways. But it is always effective. It is very difficult and arduous to create and sustain a democracy - but history shows that closing one down is much simpler. You simply have to be willing to take the 10 steps.

As difficult as this is to contemplate, it is clear, if you are willing to look, that each of these 10 steps has already been initiated today in the United States by the Bush administration. More...

~~~

Naomi Wolf's The End of America: A Letter of Warning to a Young Patriot will be published by Chelsea Green in September.

Guardian Unlimited© Guardian News and Media Limited 2007
Posted by Rowland Croucher at 7:09 PM 1 comments
Labels: Dictatorship
LETTER TO MINISTER REQUESTING WAIVER ON COMPASSIONATE GROUNDS


On the 17th October 2006, the Commonwealth issued a bankruptcy notice demanding $380,000. I responded as follows, to ministers Brough and Ruddock, requesting a waiver of this punitive action on compassionate grounds.


Dawn Rowan
PO Box 60
St Andrews
VIC 3761

18 October 2006

FOR THE URGENT ATTENTION OF:

The Honourable Mal Brough MP
Minister for Families, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs
Box 7788
Canberra Mail Centre ACT 2610

Dear Minister,

Re: Bankruptcy Proceedings Issued By The Australian Government Solicitor

I am writing to you in the hope that you will be able to assist me with
respect to bankruptcy proceedings that have been instituted against me
following sixteen years of litigation. Although I was successful in that
litigation the outcome has had a catastrophic effect on me, my health and my
career. It has now culminated with the Commonwealth serving me with a
Bankruptcy Notice no doubt with the ultimate intention of forcing me into
bankruptcy.

I am approaching you in the hope that you will intervene and bring an end to
what has been a disastrous last fifteen years of my life.

In the briefest terms can I explain.

Background

I was born in 1946 and educated in Adelaide.

I chose to follow a career as a secondary school music teacher and did so
for ten years.

Thereafter I was interested in directing my activities to counselling women
and children who had been subject to domestic violence and cruelty. I
undertook and completed a degree of Bachelor of Social Administration and
applied for and was ultimately appointed the administrator of two women’s
shelters in Adelaide.

The shelters were jointly funded by the Commonwealth and State Governments
and from 1978 myself and a number of other workers devoted ourselves to
counselling and assisting a large number of people who attended the shelters
for assistance.

Joint Report – Defamation

On 11 August 1987 a report was published by a joint committee which had been
set up by the State and Federal Governments. The report was from an
independent review committee which had been commissioned to examine the
management and operation of the women’s shelters.

The report was ultimately published and received extensive media coverage
from television stations and the press. The report contained unwarranted
and untruthful allegations of sexual and financial impropriety on the part
of myself and others associated with the management of the shelters.

The impact of the report was devastating. I had devoted my career and life
to counselling women and children and given up everything to pursue this
career. I had considered it was a most worthwhile cause and I had intended
to devote my life to that career.

As a consequence of the report, funding was withdrawn and the Christies
Beach shelter closed.

The impact on my health was immediate and I remained on sickness benefits
for two years.

I fled the State and relocated in Victoria, but my professional reputation,
my ambitions and my health had been effectively destroyed.

I was left without means of income.

Although I obtained some employment in Victoria for approximately twelve
months I ultimately had to resign from that position because of my health
and political pressure.

Litigation

Because the allegations in the report were completely false and misleading,
because my career had been ruined and I was without income I took legal
advice and commenced defamation proceedings out of the Supreme Court in
South Australia.

Whilst I had little in the way of funds, I obtained legal representation and
proceedings were instituted on 26 June 1990.

The Defendants to the proceedings were the authors of the report (these
being the State and Commonwealth employees, as well as the State and Federal
Governments). I also sued the two television stations who had published the
findings of the report.

The legal proceedings were extensive and protracted and the Defendants for
the next ten years took numerous steps to have the proceedings defeated.

The trial eventually commenced in June 2001 and proceeded for sixty-seven
days. For sixty of those days I was without legal representation and fought
the case on my own.

The State, the Commonwealth and the television stations were all represented
by Counsel, an army of solicitors and in some cases Queens Counsel.

In a judgment delivered on 21 June 2002 Justice Debelle, a senior and highly
regarded member of the bench published his reasons. He described the
allegations as a “shocking defamation”.

I was ultimately awarded the sum of approximately $585,000 in damages,
together with the costs of the action.

In subsequent contribution proceedings the amount to which the Commonwealth
was found liable to pay was $39,117.42.

Although the award of compensation was less than I had expected I felt that
my action in bringing the litigation had been vindicated. Needless to say
the years in preparing the case for trial, the trauma of fighting the case
in court without legal representation and the associated affect on my health
meant that I had been without income for virtually all of that period.

Appeals

Because of apparent unlimited resources the State, the Commonwealth and the
two television stations all lodged appeals.

In order to defend the judgment I was forced to retain solicitors and
barristers.

My health deteriorated, I was unable to work and spent a vast amount of time
instructing lawyers to defend the appeals.

I was required to sell a property which had been left to me by my mother in
order to pay legal costs associated with the appeal and the subsequent
appeal to the High Court.

Eventually the Full Court allowed the appeal.

For reasons for which I am unable to understand the two television stations
and the Commonwealth were exonerated. The damages awarded to me were
reduced, but I retained the judgment against the State of South Australia.

Whilst I was awarded 75% of my costs against the State, I was ordered to pay
the costs of the Commonwealth and the two television stations.

The total claims for costs of the Commonwealth and the two television
stations exceeded $1 million and the liability to pay these sums would have
meant that even though I had succeeded in the litigation overall, the result
would have been my bankruptcy.

Faced with this I had no further alternative than to instruct my lawyers to
appeal to the High Court.

Because the High Court considered that the matter was not of public interest
and only involved legal costs my application for special leave to appeal was
refused.

Subsequent Action by the Commonwealth

The end of the court processes left me in poor health and financially ruined
as I faced costs orders of the television stations and the Commonwealth of
over $1 million.

The two television stations have not pursued me for their legal costs. The
Commonwealth, however, has been relentless.

Since the dismissal of the High Court proceedings the Australian Government
Solicitor, on behalf of the Commonwealth, has:

· Made a demand for costs in excess of $600,000.

· Obtained an injunction against me, freezing my assets.

· Relentlessly pursued the claim for costs against me and
eventually obtained an order for lump sum payment of costs of $380,000.

· Issued a Bankruptcy Notice against me with a view to
obtaining a Bankruptcy Order.

As a consequence of this I have had funds from the sale of a house that I
owned frozen and have had access to my bank accounts limited.

In September 2005, in the course of the injunction proceedings, I requested
my solicitors to write to the AGS outlining my position. I requested that
my situation be referred to the Minister with a view that the Australian
Government Solicitor be instructed to refrain from pursuing its claim
against me.

I enclose herewith a copy of the letter that my solicitors sent to the AGS,
together with the medical report that was referred to in that letter.

I do not know what transpired as a result of that letter.

The Current Position

The Bankruptcy Notice issued by the Australian Government Solicitor demands
payment of $380,000 by 17 October 2006. I presume that if that sum is not
paid the Australian Government Solicitor will issue a petition against me
with a view to having me declared bankrupt.

I do not know if the two television stations will join in those proceedings,
but to date neither of them have made demands against me for costs. I
believe that if the Commonwealth were to withdraw its demand the two
television stations would not pursue me.

My current position is as follows:

· I have a house at St Andrews in Victoria. It is my home
and a place where I am trying to re-establish my practice as a counsellor.
The house is valued at about $500,000, but is subject to a mortgage of
nearly $130,000.

· I previously had a holiday home at Coronet Bay in
Victoria. This was sold in August 2005 for $190,000. Those funds were
frozen by the Commonwealth as part of its court proceedings and are
currently in a solicitor’s trust account in Melbourne.

· There is a balance of about $30,000 held by the State
Crown being the balance of court costs due to me. The State, however, is
claiming $17,000 of that sum.

· Overall I have spent over $380,000 in legal fees and have
no money in the bank. All of my personal financial resources have gone into
the litigation over the last fifteen years. I have less than $40,000 in a
superannuation fund.

The Future

As a result of the last fifteen years I remain shattered and confused. I
have ten years of my working life left, but with no realistic prospect of
obtaining fulltime work or employment.

If the bankruptcy proceedings continue I will certainly lose my house and
everything that I have worked for over the years.

With the limited finances that I have I would prefer to attempt to rebuild
my career as a counsellor and attempt to retain my health and my dignity. I
do not want to lose my home and become reliant on Centrelink payments.

Although the Commonwealth was excused from liability by the Full Court,
there is no doubt that its officers were involved in the preparation of the
report that ultimately was found to be grossly defamatory and which ruined
my career. Although the television stations were involved in the defamatory
conduct they have exercised clemency and have not to date pursued their
claims for costs against me. It is only the Commonwealth that has adopted a
relentless approach to have me ruined.

In the circumstances, therefore, I am again asking for clemency with the
request that you intervene and instruct your department to refrain from
pursuing its claim for legal costs.

I have forwarded a copy of this letter to the Australian Government
Solicitor with the request that it take no further bankruptcy proceedings
pending your consideration of my position.

I would be most appreciative of any assistance that you are able to afford.

I remain

Yours sincerely,

DAWN ROWAN

Copy to: The Hon Philip Ruddock MP
ATTORNEY-GENERAL